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If a previously unpaid activity (donating blood) is paid then we often observe that this 
activity is reduced. In this paper, it is hypothesised that the price offered is taken as a 
proxy for the “market value” of the activity. Depending on how the actor valued the 
activity previously, crowding-out or crowding-in, as well as persistence (or not) of the 
effect after the abandoning of payment is implied. This “naïve” explanation is 
confronted with Bénabou and Tirole’s (2003) principle-agent model where the 
opposite signalling effect is hypothesised: a higher price is taken as an indication for 
a lower value. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In his classic investigation, Titmuss (1970) reported that many blood donors stop 
donating after payment for their activity is introduced. Oberholzer-Gee et al. (1995) 
report that the acceptance rate of an atomic deposit decreased in a small Swiss town 
from 51 % to 25 % after the citizens had been offered compensation. Gneezy and 
Rustichini (2000) conducted a field experiment in Isreali Kindergartens, where 
parents often called for their children late: they were even later after a fine was 
introduced. Frey (1997) illustrates this phenomenon by anecdotal evidence of 
children who, after once being paid for cutting the grass in the family lawn, never do it 
for free again. In an overview of 128 studies Deci et al (1999) find overwhelming 
evidence for the existence of such a “crowding-out” effect in several activities. 
(Sometimes the contrary is also found: a “crowding-in” effect where, after payment, a 
previously unpaid activity is extended.) If investigated, it is also found that, usually, 
crowding-out is persistent, i.e. if payment is stopped then the activity is more likely to 
be (further) reduced than to increase again. 
 
From an economic point of view crowding-in can easily be explained. Without 
payment, the price of the activity is 0, with payment it is negative. So, except for the 
case that the activity is a “Giffen good” the reduction of its price should increase 
demand. Giffen goods are assumed to be rather rare and many economists doubt 
that they exist at all. In addition, textbook demand theory does not provide us with a 
reason for the persistence of crowding-out. 
 
For this reason, explanations for crowding-out are usually “psychological”; they are 
explained (i) as people’s desire to keep control of themselves, and their tendency to 
define themselves through their activities. Another explanation is (ii) that the actor’s 
intrinsic motivation is not acknowledged if payment is offered, and that her 
“involvement and competence is not appreciated” (Frey and Jegen, 2001, p. 594). 
Note that the following proposals do not contradict, but rather interpret these 
explanations (in particular (ii)). Neither does the following proposal contradict the 
analysis of Frey (1997, p. 20-23), but it provides an explanation of why external 
intervention may undermine intrinsic motivation (which is exogenerous in Frey, 1997). 
Closest to my proposal are assumptions by Oberholzer-Gee (2006) and   3
Harackiewicz (1979).  Oberholzer-Gee (2006, p. 432) assumes that, when a person 
in a waiting line lets a stranger jump the queue, ‘the willingness to pay for a position 
in the line indicates how hurried the stranger is.’ Harackiewicz (1979) assumes that 
extrinsic rewards have a “cue value”, i.e. performance-contingent rewards convey 
information about a subject’s capabilities. Thus Harackiewicz (1979) and 
Harackiewicz et al. (1984) compare the effect of performance-contingent tangible 
rewards with situations of verbal evaluations without tangible reward (lower activity 
level) and with a control group without reward or evaluation (higher activity level). The 
difference from my proposal is that their subjects choose the activity level under the 
“thread” of a later evaluation while, in my environment, the actor is informed about 
the value (the price) in advance. 
 
In this paper, I would like to offer a simple explanation for crowding-out (or crowding-
in) and its persistence. Let me start with activities which are clearly altruistic like the 
donation of blood or the voluntary provision of a public good (such as cutting the 
grass) which can be explained along the same lines. The idea is that the benefactor 
does not exactly know the value of her service for others but that she acts on the 
basis of an estimate. If paid, she gets a signal, namely a price, which she may 
perceive as (proportional to) the market value of her activity or as an estimate of the 
market value by others. After the adoption of the valuation, the consequence is 
crowding-out if her own estimation had been considerably higher than (in the 
proposal model at least twice) the price offered. In the next section an economic 
model of altruism is used to formalise this idea. The fourth section shows that this 
explanation can also be transferred to other activities. In the fifth section my proposal 
is compared with a Principal-Agent model by Bènabou and Tirole (2003). The sixth 
section is the conclusion. 
 
II. Defining intrinsic/extrinsic motivation 
 
“Intrinsic motivation” is difficult to define in general (see Reiss, 2005, and Lindenberg, 
2006). Take the example of a child who builds a kite. Should we say the pleasure of 
putting together the pieces is intrinsic motivation while the pleasure of seeing the kite 
fly is extrinsic motivation? Or, if we deny the latter, is the pleasure of being admired 
and envied by other children extrinsic motivation? I think all attempts to define   4
intrinsic motivation in absolute terms – as a pure pleasure of doing something – will 
ultimately fail. No man is an island. We always interact with our environment and with 
other people. Therefore I would like to propose a different approach, namely by 
defining extrinsic motivation as stemming from a change in the environment.  
 
Imagine a certain well-described situation. For an economist, this is a model-situation 
as, for example, household demand for goods and services (or activities) under given 
constraints (time, budget, etc.). For our proposal, it is also important to describe the 
information level of our decision maker. He knows to a certain degree (estimates) the 
quality of the goods and activities he consumes (vitamins, cholesterol, etc. in food, 
risk of an accident when skiing), the value of his services to others, and the social 
reputation he can gain through certain activities (flying a kite). All the actions within 
this situation can be called intrinsically motivated – with respect to the situation! 
 
Now assume that there is a change in the parameters of the situation: a price may 
change, a piece of information may be given, a restriction may become tighter, etc. 
This change may be called extrinsic motivation and the change in behaviour may be 
attributed to this extrinsic motivation. If we take the new situation on its own without 
comparing it to the old one, it is not possible to distinguish between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation. This is the way in which experiments are conducted and what I 
propose is to set up definitions in the same pragmatic way. 
 
The change in situation which dominates the intrinsic/extrinsic motivation discussion 
is the adding of tangible or verbal rewards to a certain activity. As we will see in the 
next section, for this induced change in behaviour, how this reward is interpreted is 
crucial. 
 
Usually three situations are distinguished: In period T = 0 we have certain initial 
conditions. In T = 1, a (tangible or verbal) reward for a certain activity is introduced, in 
T = 2, the reward is abandoned again. In the next section, we will investigate the 
effects of these changes under certain assumptions. Note that in psychological 
experiments there are often two separate groups, an experimental group which acts 
in the situations T = 1 and T = 2 and a control group which acts two times in the 
situation T = 0. Comparisons are made mainly between T = 0 and T = 2. For   5
applications of theories and experimental results, however, we are (more) often 
interested in the comparison of T = 0 and T = 1. Should we pay blood donors, for 
example?  
 
III. Altruism and crowding out 
 
Let us assume that preferences are monetarised and separable




(1)  U(x, y) = y + atx – c(x) 
 with 
 y   = own consumption (income), 
 x   = amount of service to others (the donation of time or goods), 
c(x)   = monetarised costs of the service, c
’ = 
dx
x dc ) (
> 0, c(0) = 0, c’(o) < at, 
        c’’ > 0 are assumed, 
tx   = monetarised benefits for others, 
a =  altruism  parameter, 0 < a < 1. 
 
Case I (No payment): y = y0 = const, t = t
* (estimated). Then the optimal amount of 
service is given by 
 
(2) c
’ (x) = at
*. 
 
Case II (Payment): y = y0 + wx, t = w (estimated)
3, i.e. the price w is taken as a signal 
for the value of the service to others. The optimal amount of service is given by 
 
(3) c
’ (x) = aw + w 
 
                                            
1 A more general model would imply the same qualitative results. I think, however, for the purpose of 
illustrating the signalling idea such a simple model suffices. 
2 A similar utility function is used by Tan and Bolle (2006) for the explanation of dictator givings with 
transfer rates t ∈ [1/4, 4]. 
3 If t = αw were estimated, the model would not change considerably. a would be substituted by aα in 
(3).   6
Case III (Compensation for outlays): y = y0+ wx, t = t
*  (estimated). The optimal 
amount of service is given by 
(4) c
’ (x) = at
* + w 
 
Thus, if compensation for outlays (instead of payment by market prices) is 
successfully communicated then we should observe the extension of the service. In 
the case of payment, we would expect crowding-out if and only if 
 
(5) t





So, because (a + 1)/a > 2, t
* has to be at least twice as large as w for crowding-out. 
The smaller w and the smaller a, the more probable is crowding-out. In tracking the 
influence of a, we should keep in mind that only activities which are estimated to be 
highly efficient (t
* high) can motivate a person with little altruism to produce a public 
good. Therefore one should not push blood donation by calling blood “priceless” (as 
advertised by the German Red Cross) and then, if one doesn’t get as much blood as 
needed, offer payment. One should at least try to communicate that the real value of 
blood is higher than the “compensation” offered.  
 














activity increases: x1 > x0  decreases considerably: x2 < x0 
t
* < w  activity increases: x1 > x0   Decreases mildly: x0 < x2 < x1 
a = 0  x1 > x0 = 0  x2 = 0 
 
Table 1: Consequences of payment and abandoning of payment. xT = level of activity 
at time T. For T= 1, 2 it is assumed that t = w. 
 
The simple model above describes also the persistence of the effect. Once payment 
has been offered, t = w (or even t ≤ w) is still estimated even when payment is 
abandoned again. The provision of the service should decrease even more if w is   7





 then we can tell the story of the boy who 
continues  cutting grass in the family lawn after payment but stops if payment ceases. 
If w > t
* then crowding-in  persists. In this case as well as in the case a = 0 control 
with extrinsic rewards is appropriate and successful. 
 
Lastly, let us emphasise a nearly trivial implication of (3): The larger w, the larger the 
contribution x. Note that this describes only the effect of varying w, not the 
introduction of payment. Not offering payment and offering w=0 are distinct cases. 
 
IV. More examples 
In the following, four examples are presented where the “altruism model” could easily 
be applied after minor adjustments. The basic model needs major adaptations, 
however, in the case of labour market behaviour where reciprocity should substitute 
altruism. Voluntary effort induced by unconditionally paid wages is crowded out when 
incentive payment (contingent rewards or fines) is offered, and this crowding-out 
effect is persistent. (Gächter et al, 2006). A possible hypothesis could be that the 
agent (worker) either adopts the norm of reciprocity which is inherent in the incentive 
contract or he refuses to sign the contract. 
 
VI.1. Working just for fun   
 
All the activities described in experiments and field studies are publicly observed 
activities – otherwise we would not be able to detect a crowding-in or crowding-out 
effect.
4 So it does not seem to be far-fetched to assume that many of these activities 
are (at least) partly motivated by showing one’s competence. In the above model we 
can interpret atx as the utility one receives from impressing others by one’s “ability” 
tx, say by solving a crossword puzzle, or playing the piano, or by attaining good 
grades in school. The crucial question is how payment is interpreted by a person 
motivated in this way. One such interpretation may be that payment it proportional to 
the “true impression”.  
 
                                            
4 The early aspiration level experiments (Hoppe, 1931) were however, carried out with „spying“. One 
might object to such a procedure due to ethical reasons. Otherwise it might be interesting to use such 
experimental techniques for intrinsic motivation.   8
If one played the piano really “just for fun” then payment might elicit the interpretation 
that the activity isn’t simply private (as the actor may have assumed) but that it has a 
public component in which case we are back in the last section’s world. Whatever the 
interpretation is, if it involves price as a signal for “the true value” of the activity, then 
the explanation of crowding-in or crowding-out follows the logic of the last section. 
 
VI.2. Negative external effects and fines 
 
If at < c
’(0), formally, negative x may be optional. -c(x), x < 0, describes the person’s 
benefits, tx her estimate of the damage she causes, and atx her “guilty conscience”. 
If a fine fx is introduced with f < t she may take this as a signal that the social damage 
is not as high as she initially believed. She then extends her “asocial” activity – for 
example, calling her children even later from the Kindergarten. 
 
VI.3. Letting someone jump the queue 
 
Imagine our altruist to be in a waiting line and someone asks her to let him in before 
her because he is in such a hurry. Would she let him in? And if he offers her some 
monetary reward, would she take it? Oberholzer-Gee (2006) experimentally 
investigates this situation. It is different from the situation analysed in Section III, first, 
because there are two other parties whose welfare is affected by the altruist’s 
decision (the person who wants to jump the queue would gain, those behind her 
would lose) and, second, because the beneficiary himself offers the reward. 
 
Let us substitute atx in (1) by a[yB+t(n+1)-qn]x, with x=waiting time for proceeding 
one place in the queue, n= number of persons behind the altruist, yB = income of the 
potential beneficiary (who wants to jump the queue), and  t,q= estimated disutility of 
x. If no monetary reward is offered (but, in this experiment, the person tells that he is 
in a hurry), she estimates t=t*, q=q*. If a reward w is offered, she estimates t= , w α  
q=q*. If she accepts the reward w her income y is substituted by y+w and yB is 
substituted by yB-w. After a monetary reward has been offered there are three 
possible decisions in the experiment of Oberholzer-Gee (2006) (instead of two in 
Section III): declining the request to jump the line, granting the request and taking the 
reward, or granting the request but rejecting the reward. Nonetheless, similar   9
consequences as in Section III can be derived, in particular we find (comparing only 
situations where rewards are offered) that larger rewards cause higher rates of 
granting requests. That coincides with the experimental results of Oberholzer-Gee 
(2006). 
 
VI.4. Uncertain costs and compensation 
 
In a way, this case is contrary to the model investigated in Section III. Above, high 
payment is “good news”: the value of one’s service is high. Here, high payment is 
“bad news”: one’s costs are high. No wonder that the effect of high payment can be 
opposite: Higher payment may reduce the activity, while in Section III higher payment 
increased the activity. (Again, comparing only situations where payment is 
introduced.) 
 
Let us come back to the model of the blood donor. She could, alternatively, 
understand the payment offered to her as a compensation for the risks of donating. 
She may have assumed her costs to be low until compensation was offered. If she 
interprets the compensation to be equal to the expected costs (which are higher than 
her ex ante estimation) and if she is risk averse then she may stop donating. While in 
the case of blood donations our original model still seems to be more appropriate, in 
the case of nuclear waste deposits the second interpretation is more plausible. 
 
Formally, we may assume 
 
(6)  U(x, y) = y +ax – c(x) – brx 
 
where c(x) are “normal” costs (mainly opportunity costs), rx is an expectation value of 
health effects and b > 1 measures (in a rather simplified way) risk aversion. “Health 
effects” r
*x describe knowledge about the average effect. So, before receiving a wage 
offer she donates according to  
 
(7)   c
’(x) = a – r
*b,  
   10
after receiving the wage offer and assuming that the true health effects are wx, she 
donates according to  
 
(8)   c
’(x) = a – wb + w.  
So, she decreases her contributions if  







(8) shows that, in this model, the activity level x decreases with w. 
 
V. Why pay? Why assume the price to be a signal?  
 
Up to now we have accepted payment and beliefs about the message of a price as 
exogenously given. Payment originates in 
 
  (i)   a naïve belief that a larger reward causes more activity 
  o r    
  (ii)   in the sophisticated belief that case t
* <  w
a
a 1 +
 (Section III) or r
* <   
   w
b
b 1 −
 (Section 4.4) applies. 
 
(i) is a standard assumption in Economics – so why should it not be held by those 
who pay for donating blood or give their children monetary incentives to cut the grass 
or improve their performance in school? If this is supported by the model in Section 2 
and (ii), the standard assumption even survives a modification with social 
preferences and incomplete information. And why shouldn’t the Red Cross be 










But why should one assume the price to be a signal? In Section 2, a blood donor 
assumes w to be the true social value of her service but, of course, we could 
substitute this belief with the more general belief that the true value is αw, α = const, 
or g(w), g
’ > 0. This would complicate the model but would not deliver different   11
results. The intrinsic question is: why should she take p as a positive signal at all? 
This belief can originate in 
 
  (iii)  a naïve belief that joint profits are split with respect to a certain fair rule 
  o r  
  (iv)  in the sophisticated belief that rewards are caused by beliefs (i) or (ii) 
    and that rewards signal higher costs or higher social values. 
 
The fact that people are endowed with a sense of fairness and judge fairness 
according to certain rules is an old credo of social scientists (Homans, 1958; Güth, 
1988). The belief that people try to be “fair” is the message of many modern models 
of social behavior (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Tan and 
Bolle, 2006). So, perhaps, (iii) is not really naïve. 
 
With (iv) we enter a new level of analysis. If the receiver of the rewards speculates 
about the motives of the offerer and vice versa we find ourselves in a “signalling 
game”. The question is whether we should really base our explanation of the 
phenomena of voluntary contributions and their payment on game theory reasoning. 
Experimental economics show that game theory is, mildly expressed, not always 
capable of explaining subjects’ behaviour. With respect to signalling games, Potters 
and van Winden (1996) interprete their data in such a way that a “decision theoretic 
approach” (which merely relies on the players’ own parameters/incentives) is more 
appropriate than a “game theoretic approach” which also takes into account 
parameters/incentives of the co-player.   
 
A Principal-Agent model of a situation as in 4.4 has been proposed by Bènabou and 
Tirole (2004). The principal (say, the Red Cross) offers the agent (the blood donor) a 
compensation w from which he concludes how large his costs are (c(x) + brx in 4.4). 
In Bènabou and Tirole (2004), x is restricted to x = 0 or x = 1. A separating 
equilibrium is necessarily in mixed strategies. It has the attributes (see Bènabou and 
Tirole, 2004, Proposition 1): 
 
(a)   Rewards are short term reinforcers: the higher w, the higher the probability of 
 compliance, i.e. x = 1.   12
(b)   Rewards are bad news: Higher wage offers signal higher costs. 
(c)   The estimation of c via (b) has a “permanent” influence on the agent’s cost 
 estimation. 
 
(a) is a necessary consequence of the agent’s “goal” to make at least some types
5 of 
principals indifferent to different rewards. Vice versa, (b) is determined by the 
principal’s “goal” to make at least some kinds
6 of agents indifferent between x = 0 
and x = 1. 
 
This sophisticated model has the advantage that it implies (b) while, in our naïve 
model above, (b) is assumed. On the other hand, however,  
 
•  we can hardly imagine the Red Cross playing  a mixed strategy, and 
 
•  (a) describes completely different behaviour compared with the models of 
Section 2 and 4.4 where we found: the higher w the smaller  x  is. (The higher 
the compensation for tolerating a nuclear deposit, the smaller the rate of 
acceptance.) If we would transfer Bènabou and Tirole’s (2004) model to that of 
Section III it would result in smaller x induced by higher w while we, again, 
expect the contrary. In Oberholzer-Gee’s (2006) experiment higher rewards 
induce higher rates of granting the request to jump the line. 
 
In order to describe behaviour in situations which may be interpreted as games we 
always have to ask ourselves whether the people involved believe that they are in 
such a situation, i.e. whether or not they believe that the Red Cross acts strategically. 
I would not like to emphasise here the limited abilities of people to carry out the 
necessary computations (which are much more demanding in the game theory 





                                            
5 We have a „reversed“ asymmetry of information (see also Bolle, 2004). So there are types (in the 
sense used in game theory) of principals distinguished by their knowledge about the agent’s costs. 
6 See footnote 5.   13
VI. Conclusion  
 
Although there is a lot of empirical work on intrinsic motivation and crowding-
out/crowding-in, most authors seem to be uneasy about the theoretical foundations of 
these effects. The advantage of the signalling hypotheses over competing 
hypotheses is that it can explain all types of (crowding-in/crowding-out, persistent or 
not) behaviour while psychological theories need different approaches. Let me 
emphasise that I do not contradict arguments of self-determination, etc.; more than 
one influence may possibly play a role. It will be an empirical question of how well the 
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